The Political Economy of Illegal Domains in India and China by Felbab-Brown, Vanda
The Political Economy of Illegal Domains in
India and China
VANDA FELBAB-BROWN*
This article explores what happens to economic transactions and political arrangements
when rule of law collapses, has never emerged, or is purposefully rejected. In other words,
it examines what happens when in certain domains, such as illicit economies, there are no
legally sanctioned rules, or the existing official rules only prohibit the existence of the
domain. I address several basic questions about illicit economies: How do illicit econo-
mies arise and how are they organized; what are the regulatory requirements for their
functioning; and what threats do illicit economies pose to countries? In exploring these
questions, I analyze the role of several agents: the role of the state and its representatives
and the effects of their policies toward illicit economies; the relationship between local
populations participating in the illicit economy and anti-state belligerents; and the interac-
tions between criminal networks and belligerents. I examine these dynamics primarily
with respect to India and China, both contemporarily and historically, but also draw on
other countries for comparison.
I. What are Illicit Economies and How They Are Organized
Illicit economies encompass economic transactions, services, and commodities-the
production and provision of which are either completely prohibited by governments and/
or international regimes, or partially proscribed unless their production and provision
comply with special licenses, certification, taxation, and other economic and political reg-
ulations. Illicit economies thus include, for example, the cultivation of illicit crops, the
production and trafficking of illicit drugs, human smuggling, illicit logging, smuggling of
wildlife, protection rackets, money laundering, or systematic insurance fraud.i Illicit
economies differ from ordinary crime in their sustainability, the repeated nature of the
transactions, and their complexity. They frequently involve a multitude of actors who
engage in sustained economic exchange on a repeated basis. At minimum, these actors
include suppliers and consumers, but they can involve layers of intermediaries, subcon-
* Brookings Research Fellow in Foreign Policy at the Brookings Institution & author of SHOOTING UP:
COUN'rE'RINSURGENCY AND THE WAR ON DRUGS (Brookings, 2009).
1. For an overview of the variety of illicit economies, see R.T. NAYLOR, WAGES OF CRLMP: BLACK MAR-
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tractors, and specialized service providers. A one-time mugging at gunpoint on the streets
of Shanghai or a bank robbery in Mumbai represents crime, but they do not amount to an
illicit economy. But a systematic protection racket enforced by violence, such as those
conducted by the Triads in Macau or Hong Kong, for example, do constitute illicit mar-
kets and economies.
Illicit economies and illicit businesses vary greatly in their organizational structures.
The popular image of organized crime has been deeply affected by Mario Puzo's GODFA-
THER model of a typical crime organization as a hierarchical family structure with an all-
powerful "capo" at the top. In fact, neither in Asia, nor elsewhere in the world is such a
crime structure the most typical or even the most prevalent. Family connections, like
ethnic affiliation, do play an important role as one organizing basis for illicit enterprises.
Such connections mitigate critical vulnerabilities and business impediments due to the
lack of trust and risk of defections in the absence of established rules of law, weak property
rights, and minimal dispute-resolution mechanisms. But illicit enterprises are rarely
tightly hierarchical with the top boss wielding a general-like control over the ranks. 2 If
anything, the trend over the past two decades has been toward decentralization not just in
the legal business domain, but also in the illicit one.
The Chinese Triads represent one example of a hierarchical and vertically complex
crime business. The Chinese Triads, and their Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan varieties,
are secret organizations, with a centuries-long history in the region, especially in mainland
China. But despite their notorious initiation rituals and dramatic membership passwords,
the Triads are far from perfectly disciplined and tightly-controlled underground armies
with a general at the top. Rather, they are loose associations of independent gangs with
fluid internal membership, a good amount of internal infighting, and inter-Triad competi-
tion. 3 Moreover, not all Triad members are criminals. 4 In Hong Kong, for example,
many members have regular jobs and do not participate in criminal activities at all. 5
The Triads are involved in a variety of illegal businesses, one of the most important of
which is to deliver order within a certain underground economic space, whether such
space involves physical territory or simply an economic activity domain.6 Such a role is
frequently the primary function of the Triad and more important to its power than the
distribution of a prohibited commodity. For example, it is widely believed that the Triads
control drug distribution in China, Hong Kong, and Macau. 7 No doubt, individual mem-
bers peddle in drugs. In Hong Kong's street-level pushing, for example, Triad member-
ship enables access to distribution rights for a specified territory.8 More systematically,
some Triad organizations control a share of the drug trade. But more often than not,
Triads only serve as providers of selling and transshipment rights to major drug trafficking
2. See YtU KONG CHu, THE TRIADS As BUSINESs 22 (2000).
3. Id.
4. See id. at 41-80.
5. For details, see id.
6. Id. at 43-45.
7. Id. at 84.
8. Id. at 87.
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groups, rather than being the dominant actors in the illicit drug trade in East Asia.9 The
critical commodity they sell is control of a territory, rather than the illegal product itself.
Yet even the loose triad organizational chart is still far more organized than the typical
structure of another Asian criminal business-the smuggling by sea of illegal immigrants
from China to the United States. Most of this illicit business is conducted by "mom and
pop" operations based on family and neighborhood connections. Apart from being small
and disorganized, many of these smuggling firms are highly temporal, with many of them
going out of business after organizing only a few (and sometimes just a single) smuggling
facilitation. 10 On the other hand, smuggling of immigrants from China to the United
States by air is dominated by organized Hong Kong crime syndicates because they have a
competitive advantage in having established networks of corruption, access, and evasion
for non-human illicit commodities in Hong Kong, one of the world's most advanced and
busicst transportation and communication centers. The fact that illegal entry by nir nso
requires fake documents gives the organized crime groups a further advantage because
they are deeply connected to the counterfeiting enterprises in the city, which is one of the
world's counterfeiting capitals. In contrast, smuggling of illegal immigrants from Mexico
to the United States, even by land, has become dominated by organized drug trafficking
cartels, and most independent "coyotes" (the term used for a smuggler of undocumented
persons) either have been pushed out of business or can operate only as a franchise of the
drug cartels." If anything characterizes the organizational structure of crime businesses
in Asia (and around the world), it is the variety of their size and shape.
II. How Illicit Economies Emerge
Illicit economies arise due to, and are shaped by, a multitude of factors. At the most
basic level, the existence of an illicit economy is caused by the inability of the state to
enforce its laws. The lack of state presence or attention permits, and sometimes necessi-
tates, economic activity outside of the legal realm. But the very existence of an illicit
economy requires some kind of pre-existing regulation-state or international-that pro-
hibits certain economic transactions from taking place. The impetus for the emergence of
a particular illicit economy can be the criminalization of certain behavior, such as the
consumption and production of illicit substances, or the imposition of some limitation on
economic activity, such as the requirement that all trade with legal goods be subject to
taxation. In fact, any form of government regulation sets up the first crucial, though not
sufficient, condition for the emergence of an illicit economy. Without such regulation, in
the true absence of state and international governance, the emergent economic activities
may be irregular or informal, but they would not be illicit. This distinction is far from
merely definitional: it has crucial implications for the ability of criminal and belligerent
9. Yiu Kong Chu, Global Triads: Myth or Reality? in TRANSNATIONAL ORGANIZED CRIME AND INTERNA-
TiONAL SECURITY 183, 189-90 (Mats Berdal & M6nica Serrano eds., 2002); Sheldon Zhang & Ko-Lin Chin,
The Declining Significance of Triad Societies in Transnational Illegal Activities, 43 BRrr. J. CRIMINOLOGY 469-88
(2003).
10. Sheldon Zhang & Ko-Lin Chin, Enter the Dragon: Inside Chinese Human Smuggling Organizations, 40
CRIMINOLOGY 737-68 (2002).
11. See Susan Saulny & Randal C. Archibold, U.S. Indicts 10 Mexicans Reputed to Be Drug Lords, N.Y.TIMES,
Aug. 20, 2009, available at http://www.nyimes.com/2009/08/2 l/us/2 lcartel.html?.r=2.
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actors to exploit such economies and defines the range of states' policy options to such
economies.
Second, the emergence of an illicit economy is also critically dependent on the inability
or unwillingness of the state or international regime to fully enforce its prohibition.12 In
other words, the existence of an illicit economy is an expression of the limits of the regu-
lating entity's official enforcement capacity. I stress official enforcement capacity because
the existence of an illicit economy, despite government or international prohibition, fre-
quently leads to and is predicated on the corruption of regulators and state enforcers who
are tempted by the large profits from the illicit economy or threatened by the violence
that frequently accompanies illicit markets.' 3 In fact, the actors best positioned to profit
from an illicit economy and manage it are often the official state enforcers. 14
A third crucial condition for the emergence of an illicit economy is some level of de-
mand for the commodity or service.' 5 The existence of such demand despite criminaliza-
tion is what leads to the very high profits that illicit economies generate.' 6
Criminalization and enforcement do have a direct impact on demand, discouraging some
consumers from consuming the product or service by the threat of punishment and by the
psychological discomfort of violating a social norm. But without a concerted and complex
effort to address demand, criminalization and enforcement by themselves tend to be insuf-
ficient to stamp out all existing demand. Sometimes, criminalization or regulation even
generates new demand by making a product look desirable or by creating the expectation
of an upcoming shortage of supply. Hence the arguments that young people are drawn to
illicit drugs precisely because their consumption defies parental and state regulation and
the paradox that placing a species on the endangered species list can result in its greater
slaughter. 17
These three elemental conditions for the existence of illicit economies: extant regula-
tion, limits to state capacity, and demand-are of course ever-present. Thus illicit econo-
mies exist virtually everywhere-in rich and poor countries; in the midst of war and in the
midst of peace; in urban capitals and rural peripheries. Even in authoritarian countries
with very strong law enforcement capacity, the state faces crucial limits to its reach, be it
Communist China or Suharto's Indonesia. The state does not have to be failing or weak to
have an extensive illicit economy.
12. See H. RICHARD FRMAN & PEIiER ANDREAS, T1E ILLICIT GLOBAL ECONOMY AND STATE POWER 1-
23 (1999).
13. Susan Rose-Ackerman, The Political Economy of Corruption, in CORRUPTION AND -n w GLOBAL ECON-
OMY 31 (Kimberly Ann Elliot ed., 1978).
14. Every country that has dealt with the problem of large illicit economies has abundant stories of official
corruption, be those of entire police units in Mexico functioning as the drug traffickers' hit men; the Blue
Cartel in Colombia; the permeation of the state by drug traffickers in Burma/Myanmar; or friendly relations
between Al Capone and police members in Chicago. For a recent call to watch the watchdogs, see NANCY
LUBIN FT AL., NARCOiCS IN-I iRDICTION IN AFGHANISTAN AND CENTRAL ASiA (2002), http://
www.eurasianet.org/policy-forum/lubin012902a.pdf.
15. Rose-Ackerman, supra note 13, at 31.
16. KEVIN JACK RILEY, SNOW JOB? 90 (1996).
17. See Philippe Rivalan et al., Can Bans Stimulate Wildlife Trade? 447 NATURE 529, 529-30 (2007).
Neither Rivalan nor I argue against environmental protection or awarding special protection to certain spe-
cies. But the issue of environmental regulation for species protection once again highlights the need to have
the necessary enforcement ready to uphold the regulation before it is issued or otherwise risk setting up large-
scale and pernicious illicit economies.
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In fact, the correlation between the condition of the legal economy and the size of the
illegal one is highly complex and does not allow for easy causality statements. In India,
much of the organized protection-extortion business as well as street-level drug distribu-
tion coincide with poverty and unmet needs of citizens due to failures of governance.
Unlike the top echelons of India's drug trade, such as Dawood Ibrahim or Arun Gawli, for
example, street-level peddlers rarely escape from poverty. Instead, entire slums are re-
cruited into street-level distribution because of a lack of legal, economic, and social oppor-
tunities, and remain in a condition of poverty and marginalization.iS
But the expansion of a legal economy generates its own opportunities for the growth of
illegal businesses and crime. The economic reforms that began in China in the late 1970s
enabled not only the immense growth of the legal economy, but also a great revival of
illicit economies and organized crime in China. China has once again become a major
transs hiLpment country for heroin, and its own consumption of opiates and other illicit
drugs has increased dramatically. China is also a major destination for stolen cars and
other smuggled commodities, while being the principal exporter of counterfeit and pirated
goods throughout the world.19 It is also the world's largest processing center for illicit
timber from Russia and elsewhere in Asia, including India, Burma, and Indonesia. China,
in turn, supplies this illicit lumber to Vestern nations and, increasingly, to meet its own
demand for timber products.20 Paradoxically, the state's rather effective clampdown on
logging in China, which for decades had devastated its forests, only spread the uncon-
trolled logging problem to other parts of Asia, frequently destroying pristine forests. 21 It
was precisely China's economic reforms, its economic expansion, and its ability to plug
into the global economy that allowed it to rise to the top of the world's illicit logging
industry as well as the pirated goods industry.
The illicit wildlife trade and the consumption of illegal non-timber forest products in
China further shows the complexity of poverty, prosperity, and crime. China is not only
the biggest magnet for illegally-cut timber; it is also the world's biggest magnet for the
illicit trade in and consumption of wildlife products.22 And unlike in the case of timber,
the vast majority of illicit wildlife products, such as ivory, rhino horn, tiger parts, (many
supplied from India) and various exotic meats, are also consumed in China. Surprisingly,
both China's persisting poverty and its new economic prosperity fuel this illicit economy
and devastate the world's ecologies and endangered species. The consumption of various
fauna and flora as homeopathic medicines has a millennia-old tradition in China. But
apart from the long-established cultural tradition, much of its persistence there, unlike
elsewhere in the world, is linked to the continuing poverty in rural China where modern
medical facilities are not present, and where hospital and modern medical services are very
expensive for the local population. Resorting to eagle eyes as cures for blindness and
18. See, e.g., Molly Charles et al., The Bombay Underworld: A Descriptive Account and Its Role in Drug Trade,
in GLOBALIA7AFION, DRUGS, AND CRIoAINAL!u/TION: A FINAL REPORT ON BRAZIL, CIINA, INDIA, AND
MExico 133-67 (1999), available at http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0012/001276/127644e.pdf.
19. See Ruben D. Manahan, 2 OFWs Set to Transport Heroin to China Nabbed, THE MAmLA TMES, Aug.
19, 2009, available at http://www.manilatimes.net/national/2009/aug/19/yehey/metro/20090819metl .htl.
20. For details, see ZHu CHUNQUAN ET AL., CHINA'S WOOD MARKET, TRADE, AND THE ENVIRONAIENT
(2004), http://assets.panda.org/downloads/chinawoodmarkettradeenvironment.pdf.
21. Id.
22. Illegal Wildlife Trade Grows in China, REUTERS UK, Dec. 4, 2007, available at http://uk.reuters.com/
article/idUKPEK7057220071204.
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snake blood as a source of vitality is thus not only driven by culture and tradition, but also
by the lack of physically and financially-accessible modern medical services.
On the other hand, the consumption of exotic meats, including tiger parts, in China is
greatly correlated with prosperity. Traditionally, the consumption of exotic meats had
been associated with prosperity and advanced social status, but few Chinese citizens could
afford them. The increases in disposable income in China since the 1980s and the eco-
nomic advancement of tens of millions of people spurred a rampant increase in demand
for exotic meats and elixirs, thus dramatically fueling the illicit trade in wildlife. 23
While the relationship between the level of crime and the size of illicit economies on
the one hand, and the level of poverty and prosperity on the other is complex and highly
context-dependent, the differing capacity of states to provide legally for the economic and
security needs of their populations greatly alter the importance of the illicit economy for
local populations. These varying contexts also significantly change the security and politi-
cal implications for the state suppressing the illicit economy. In a poor country where
most of the legal economy has collapsed and the illicit economy is the only game in town,
the state's effort to destroy it will be resented and opposed by a large segment of the
population who depend on the illicit economy for basic livelihood. Moreover, under such
conditions, the corruption of government representatives easily becomes widespread. By
contrast, in a rich country with plentiful sources of legal livelihood and economic advance-
ment, the state's crackdown on an illicit economy may well be welcomed by the popula-
tion whose economic well-being allows it to place higher importance on upholding rule of
law and moral norms.
To be sure, even among poor countries, there are significant differences in the size and
kinds of illicit economies. Opium poppy, for example, can be grown equally across much
of Asia, yet the illicit cultivation of opium poppy has been highly concentrated in the
Golden Triangle and Golden Crescent since China eradicated its poppy cultivation in the
1950s. Whatever the comparative advantage is that centers poppy cultivation in the
Golden Triangle and Golden Crescent and not in Malaysia, Indonesia, or Taiwan, once a
large-scale illicit economy becomes established in an area, its existence frequently provides
a favorable environment for spawning of other illicit economies. The suppression of an
illicit economy in a particular locale thus frequently leads only to its transformation into a
different kind of illicit economy. The development of a "technology of illegality" smug-
gling networks, corruption of officials, crime and protection knowhow, and the rise of
powerful actors with a vested interest in the preservation of the illicit economy creates
extremely auspicious conditions for the perpetuation of illicit economic activity.
IH. What Makes Illicit Economies Function Smoothly
Although illicit economies thrive in places where the official regulation entity's means
of suppression are limited, they nonetheless frequently require some level of regulation.
At a minimum, just like legal economies, the illicit ones greatly benefit from and are fre-
quently dependent on some degree of predictability and the assurance of property rights.24
23. Id.
24. Although Charles Tilly in his timeless book highlighted state consolidation as a way to assure property
rights by expanding legality-with legality meaning simply official sanctioning by the ruling entity, the need
for the existence of a governing authority to facilitate the thriving of an economy by reducing transaction
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The "wild" space is rarely fully wild: in the case of illicit economies, it is only differently
governed. 25 In his classic study of the Sicilian Mafia, Diego Gambetta demonstrated that
the key activity of the Mafia is not its provision of illegal and otherwise-absent goods (such
as drugs), but its provision of protection and enforcement of contracts, very much akin to
the Chinese Triads' primary activity, as mentioned above. 26 In poorly administered re-
gions, such as Sicily, the threat of untrustworthy and dangerous business competitors,
corrupt government officials, as well as thieves and robbers is so acute that the residents of
these regions require extra-legal physical protection and contract enforcement guarantees
so that basic economic transactions can take place. 27 Gambetta's central claim is that "the
main market for mafia services is to be found in unstable transactions in which trust is
scarce and fragile."2s In other words, in the absence of social trust,2 9 even basic economic
transactions, whether lawful, illicit, or informal, require the provision of regulation and
enforcement. Total chaos and complete removal of the governing authority poses critical
threats to the survival of the illicit (as well as lawful) economies and threatens the interests
of the traffickers as well as the wider population.
Just as in licit economies (arguably even more so because authority is frequently subject
to intense contestation), in illicit economies the ability to assure property rights and en-
force contracts is strongly dependent on the effective use or threats of violence. What
kinds of actors are available to provide security, assure property rights, and have military
means at their disposal in illicit economies? By defining the economy as illicit, the state
(or international regime) is officially removing itself from the menu of actors willing to
assure the functioning of that economy. Here is where the distinction between illicit and
informal becomes critical: if the state (or international regime) had defined the economy
merely as informal, it would be capable of officially inserting itself into the economy and
taking over its regulation, with all the traditional benefits like financial profits through
taxation, and capturing the top positions in the economy so as to establish political control
available. But by defining the economy as illegal, the state is officially committing itself to
suppressing the economy, not to facilitating its functioning. Hence, to fill the lacuna of
governance necessary for the provision of the minimum protection and regulatory func-
tions that the economy needs for smooth functioning, other actors with access to coercive
power constitute the operative regime: well-armed criminal groups, such as the Triads and
other organized crime; warlords; insurgents and terrorists; paramilitaries; and corrupt
government representatives, such as military and police officials. The ability of such ac-
tors to successfully spread through the illegal economy is linked to their ability to outcom-
costs and assuring property rights applies to illicit economies as well. CHARLES TILLY, COERCION, CAPITAL-
iSM, ANTD EUROPEAN STATES, AD 990-1990 (1990).
25. For a detailed analysis of alternative forms of governance across many seemingly "ungoverned spaces,"
see Anne Clunnan & Harold Trinkunas, Ungoverned Spaces: Alternatives to State Authority in an Era of Softened
Sovereignty, INTI'L STUDIEs ASSN. (forthcoming).
26. See generally DIEGO GAMBEYVFA, THE SICILIAN MAFIA: T-IE BuSINESS OF PRIVATE PROTFECTION
(1993).
27. Id.
28. Id. at 17.
29. For more arguments about the role of trust and social capital, see Robert D. Putnam, The Prosperous
Community: Social Capital and Public Life, THE AM. PROSPECT, Mar. 21, 1993, at 35, http://www.prospect.org/
cs/articles?article=the-prosperous community.
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pete others in the provision of the regulations and services necessary for the functioning of
the illicit economy.
Afghanistan provides an example. Prior to the emergence of the Taliban in late 1994,
Afghanistan deteriorated into numerous violent fiefdoms controlled by tribally based war-
lords and their militias. As a result of the Soviet invasion and the subsequent civil war, the
legal economy came close to a complete halt. Two illicit economies dominated economic
activity in the country and provided livelihood for the majority of the population: the
expanding cultivation of opium poppy, and illicit smuggling with licit goods. Estimated at
$2.5 billion a year,30 the illicit smuggling with licit goods was nonetheless critically ham-
pered by predatory warlords who complicated the life of the smuggling mafia. Charging
increasingly higher tolls and sometimes even stealing the contraband, the warlords
threatened not only to severely jeopardize profits for the smuggling mafia, but also to
paralyze the trade itself.
The emergence of the Taliban presented the traffickers with a force that could assure
that transaction costs were significantly lowered and business was carried out in a more
predictable fashion. Purported to be long incensed with the excesses of the predatory
warlords on the highways and by their arbitrary extortion, Mullah Omar willingly pro-
vided protection to the illicit smuggling enterprise. In the fall of 1994, just as the Taliban
first emerged around Kandahar, it cleared the chains from the roads, set up a one-toll
system for trucks entering Afghanistan at Spin Baldak, and patrolled and protected the
highways against the warlords.31 Crucially, the Taliban also declared that it "would not
allow goods bound for Afghanistan to be carried by Pakistani trucks," thus satisfying a key
demand of the Afghan transport mafia.32 The interests of the transport mafia were satis-
fied, and from the beginning the traffickers and the Taliban struck up very good relations.
As a result, the Taliban was paid handsomely by the traffickers and the traffickers did not
interfere with the Taliban's military expansion.
Criminals and belligerents do not, however, perform the regulatory and protection
functions only for the illicit business elite. Critically, they perform a similar protection
and regulatory function for the producers of the illicit product, such as the cultivators of
illicit crops. The producers are vulnerable to predation by the traffickers who frequently
pay meager wages and otherwise abuse the producers. The belligerents hence have the
opportunity to fill the role of a protection and regulation agent, bargaining on behalf of
the producers for better wages and limiting the traffickers' abuse.33
Operational pressures toward the establishment of at least some rules, regulations, and
informal rule of law apply not only to illicit economies underpinned by violence, but also
to informal economies not normally considered criminal. Begging in India, for example,
is frequently controlled by kingpins who allot begging territories, especially highly prized
ones such as those near premier tourist spots, to individual beggars for a fee. Beggars are
paid either a fixed salary or a commission from daily earnings, and sometimes even have a
30. Frederik Balfour, Dark Days for a Black Market: Afghanistan and Pakistan Rely Heavily on Smuggling,
Bus. WEEK., Oct. 15, 2001, at 38, http://businessweek.com/magazine/content/0 142/b3753016.htm.
31. AHMED RASHID, TALIBAN: ISLAM, OIL AND THE NEW GREAT GAME IN CEN-rRAL ASIA 29 (2001).
32. Id.
33. For details, see VANDA FELBAB-BROWN, SHOOTING UP: COUN-TERINSURGENCY AND THE WAR ON
DRUGS (forthcoming 2009).
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day off during the week as well as a longer vacation. 34 Although this informal economy
creates less vulnerability to beggars than the illegal sex industry does to prostitutes where
the need for protection is much larger, even informal begging benefits from, and hence
tends toward some form of regulation and informal enforcement.35
The existence of the dual audience and of two principals that belligerents and other
regulating agents in illicit economies face, the poor producers of illicit commodities and
services and the criminal business elites, frequently generates friction between the bel-
ligerents and the traffickers. Instead of merging into a conglomerate actor, the criminal-
insurgent or terrorist-criminal, the two actors frequently fight each other. To the extent
that the state is cracking down on them, the criminals and the belligerents may well coop-
erate. 36 But at the same time, criminal entrepreneurs and belligerents have some key di-
verging objectives. Instead of representing permanent alliances or the merger into one
agglomerate actor with common goals, the relationship is fraught with problems, and just
as easily falls apart as it comes together.
IV. Threats that Illicit Economies Pose to States
Illicit economies present a variety of threats to states. They threaten the state politically
by providing an avenue for criminal organizations and corrupt politicians to enter the
political space, thus undermining the democratic process. As such, actors are able to se-
cure official positions of power or wield influence from behind the scenes, and the legiti-
macy of the political process is subverted. The problem perpetuates itself as politicians
bankrolled with illicit money become successful, making it more difficult for others to
resist participating in the illicit economy. This dynamic leads to endemic corruption at
both the local and national levels. The presence of large-scale illicit economies also create
international political costs for the state by generating a reputation for weakness, incom-
petence, and illegitimacy for the state among influential international actors, such as pow-
erful states, international organizations, and multinational corporations.
Large illicit economies with powerful traffickers also threaten the judicial system of the
country. First, as the size of the illicit economy grows, the investigative capacity of the
law enforce'ment and judicial system diminishes. Impunity for criminal activity also in-
creases, undermining the credibility and deterrence capacity of the judicial system and the
authority of the government. Second, powerful traffickers frequently turn to violent
means to deter and avoid prosecution, killing off or bribing prosecutors, judges and
witnesses. 37
Illicit economies also have larger economic effects. Drug cultivation and processing, for
example, on the one hand generate employment for the poor rural population, numbering
34. Author's fieldwork in India in May and June 2008.
35. In 15th and 16th century France, for example, begging was similarly organized into underworld gangs
and run by capos and was frequently intimately overlaid by illicit economic activities, such as pick-pocketing.
36. For seminal work on the role of crime in security issues, see Phil Williams, Transnational Criminal
Organizations and International Security, in WORLD SECURITY: CHALLENGES FOR A NFw CENTURY 249-72
(Michael T. Klare & Yogesh Chandrani eds., 1998).
37. See M6nica Serrano & Maria Celia Toro, Fron Drug Trafficking to Transnational Organized Crime in
Latin America, in TRANSNATIONAL ORGANIZED CRIME AND LNTERNATIONAL SECURTY: BUSINESS AS
USUAL? 155, 155-182 (Mats Berdal & Monica Serrano, eds., 2002); Mauricio Rubio, iolence, Organized
Crime, and the Criminal Justice System in Colombia, 32 J. EcON. ISSUES 605, 605-10 (1998).
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frequently in the hundreds of thousands. Not only does the drug economy allow the
impoverished poor to make ends meet, it also facilitates upward mobility for many partici-
pants. On the other hand, the presence of a large-scale illicit economy also contributes to
inflation, and can therefore harm legitimate export-oriented, import-substituting indus-
tries. It encourages real estate speculation and a rapid rise in real estate prices, and under-
mines currency stability. It also displaces legitimate production, complicating efforts to
develop legitimate economic activity. The illicit economy can thus lead to the so-called
"Dutch disease," where a boom in an isolated sector of the economy causes, or is accom-
panied by stagnation in other core sectors because it gives rise to appreciation of land and
labor costs. 38
Certain illicit economies also create environmental threats to the state. The smuggling
of wildlife in Burma and Indonesia, for example, depletes biodiversity and contributes to
the demise of endangered species. Illicit logging, already mentioned with respect to
China and other parts of Asia, leads to further soil erosion and desertification, making
land inhospitable for agriculture. Poppy cultivation in the Golden Triangle sometimes
further compounds deforestation.
Finally, the presence of a large-scale, illicit economy in the context of violent conflict
greatly exacerbates security threats to the state. First, crime organizations and traffickers
themselves can pose significant security and political threats to the state by accumulating
political power and challenging its monopoly of violence and undermining public safety.
India and China provide many examples of how extensive the power of crime organiza-
tions can be. For example, the South China Sea coast was plagued by piracy for centuries.
Between 1790 and 1810, piracy in the area experienced spectacular growth, undermined
legal trade, and severely threatened public safety.39 Pirates dominated the entire region
from near the border with Vietnam through Hainan to southern Guangdong. At their
peak, they numbered 50,000-70,000 men and women organized in six fleets and 2000
junks.4- They extorted large sums of money from coastal villages, and destroyed those
who refused to pay. The power of the pirates was so great, and so overwhelmed the law
enforcement apparatus that eventually the government was forced to introduce a policy of
pardon and pacification, allowing thousands of pirates to start new lives ashore with much
of their proceeds intact and awarding their leaders with high positions in the government
and navy. 41 In the contemporary period, the dacoits (robbers and bandits) in India's Uttar
Pradesh in the 1980s so undermined public safety in the area and threatened the state that
their activities amounted to a de facto insurgency.
Periodically, the state could only defeat very powerful organized crime groups by rely-
ing on a preponderance of military power. In the late 1990s, for example, Macau was
caught up in a bloody war among local Triads and between the Triads and the govern-
ment, precipitated by the arrest of the leader of the 14K Triad society, Wan Kuok-koi,
alias "Broken-Tooth Koi." Wan was not only a key kingpin of the island's many illegal
businesses, but also had intimate connections to Macau's gambling and banking industries.
38. See, e.g., FRANCISCO E. THouIJu, ILLEGAL DRUGS, ECONOMY, AND SOcIETY IN THE ANDES (2003);
VIOLENCE IN COLOMBIA 1990-2000: WAGING WAR AND NEGOTIATING PEACE 75-94 (Charles Bergquist
et al. eds., 2001).
39. See generally DIAN H. MURRAY, PIRATES OF THE SOUTH CHINA COAST 1790-1810 (1987).
40. Id. at 1.
41. Id.
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The violence that resulted from the intra-Triad conflict following Wan's arrest and his
retaliation against the state was so great that tourism plummeted and citizens were afraid
to go on the streets. Ultimately, it took the deployment of heavily-armed troops from
China's People's Liberation Army to restore public safety in Macau and end the violence.
And unlike in Hong Kong, Macau's population by and large did not fear encroachment on
civil liberties after Macau's re-absorption into China because crime and insecurity had
come to dominate their daily priorities.42
Belligerent groups that embrace illicit economies also derive a multitude of benefits
from such illicit economies that allow them to greatly increase their strength and seriously
threaten the state. With the large profits from the illicit economies, belligerents improve
their physical resources to fight the state: they can hire more combatants, pay them better
salaries, and equip them with better weapons.
Critically, participation in illicit economies greatly increases the belligerents' political
capital-i.e., the extent to which the population welcomes and tolerates the presence of
the belligerents. Large-scale illicit economies frequently provide basic livelihood for the
population; and by sponsoring the illicit economy, belligerents are capable of distributing
real-time economic benefits to the population. Moreover, as discussed before, belliger-
ents also provide protection and regulation services to the producers. Finally, with the
large financial profits from the illicit economy, belligerents also often provide a variety of
otherwise-absent social services.
Yet the interaction between the population and the belligerents involved in illicit econo-
mies is often highly complex. India's isolated and poor Northeast, consisting of the states
of Arunachal Pradesh, Assam, Manipur, Meghalaya, Mizoram, Nagaland, and Tripura, has
long been troubled by a multitude of ethno-nationalist separatist groups with various
cross-border ties, and by corrupt and ineffective local governance.43 The region also hap-
pens to lie in the Western corner of the Golden Triangle, which for decades has been one
of the world's largest production areas of opiates.44 In Burma, across the border from
India's Northeast, opium cultivation and the heroin trade have supported a myriad of
ethnic and Communist insurgencies as well as rightist paramilitaries and drug lords' ar-
mies since the 1950s. 45 Although most Burmese trade has moved north into the Yunnan
Province of China, India's Northeast region has also become an important transshipment
area. Like their counterparts in Burma, many of India's insurgent groups in the North-
east, such as the National Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN), the Kuki National
Army (KNA), and the United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA), have turned to protect-
ing drug smuggling enterprises as a way to generate financial resources. 46 But because the
vast majority of poppy cultivation has been centered in Burma, participation in the drug
trade on the part of India's belligerents has brought little economic opportunities to the
local population in the Northeast.47 Because trafficking in drugs and the protection of
42. BERTIL LINTER, BLOOD BROTHERS: CRIME, BUSINESS AND POLITICS IN ASIA 70-85 (2003).
43. Q&A: India's Violent Northeast, BBC NEws, Oct. 4, 2004, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/
2/hi/south asa/32254670.stm.
44. ALFRED McCoy, THE POLITICS OF HEROIN IN SOUTHEAST ASIA 9 (1972).
45. Id. at 126-27.
46. Renaud Egreteau, Instability at the Gate: India's Troubled Northeast and its External Connections, (CSH
Occasional Paper No. 16, 2006).
47. Id.
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drug convoys is not labor intensive, this illicit economic activity could only employ the
Northeast belligerents while it offered no extensive job opportunities for the wider popu-
lation. Rather than bringing economic benefits, the belligerents' participation in the drug
trade and the rise of smuggling through India's Northeast generated social ills.48 The
drug trade there (as elsewhere) has been accompanied by an increase in addiction rates,
generating a popular outcry against drug trafficking.49 Consequently, many groups, such
as People's Liberation Army (PLA) in Manipur, NSCN, and ULFA, have sought to pub-
licly distance themselves from the drug trade by cracking down on and killing local ped-
dlers and addicts, even while frequently clandestinely \continuing their international
traffic.50
Similarly, building off of a local culture of animal protection, the Bodo Security Force
(BdSF), which has been seeking to liberate "Bodoland" from Assam took it upon itself to
enforce anti-poaching laws. For example, they singled out known rhinoceros poachers
and delivered them a notice to cease their activities. If the poachers failed to comply, the
Bodo militants killed them. The BdSF's location in the Manas National Park and the
economic pressures of providing for their insurgency later encouraged the group to violate
its own edicts and local community mores by dabbling in the illicit wildlife trade. But the
subsequent public outcry was so strong that the BdSF aborted its participation in the illicit
trade and went back to enforcing environmental protection.
51
Four factors crucially influence the extent to which belligerent groups derive political
capital from their sponsorship of illicit economies: the state of the overall economy in the
country/region; the character of the illicit economy; the presence or absence of indepen-
dent traffickers; and the government's response to the illicit economy.
First, the state of the overall economy determines the extent to which the local popula-
tion is dependent upon the illicit economy for basic livelihood and social advancement.
The poorer the country and the smaller the size and accessibility of the licit economy, the
greater is the dependence of the population on the illicit one, and the greater is the politi-
cal capital that accrues to belligerents for sponsoring the illicit economy. On the other
hand, in a rich developed country with a plentitude of legal economic opportunities, the
larger population may well object to the illicit economy, and the belligerents' participation
in it can discredit them.
Second, the character of the illicit economy determines the extent to which the illicit
economy provides employment for the population. Labor-intensive illicit economies,
such as the cultivation of illicit crops, easily employ hundreds of thousands to millions of
people in a particular locale. The smuggling in drugs or other contraband, on the other
hand, is a non-labor intensive illicit economy that frequently employs only hundreds of
people. Belligerents' sponsorship of labor-intensive illicit economies thus brings them
much greater, and more widespread political capital than their sponsorship of labor-non-
48. See, e.g., Mahendra P. Lama, India's North-East States: Narcotics, Small Arms, and Misgovernance, 19
ETHNIC STUDis RFPORT 243, 243-258 (2001).
49. Id. at 253-54.
50. See, e.g., Subir Bhaumik, Guns, Druigs, and Rebels, MANIPUR ONLINE, Feb. 18, 2006, http://
www.manipuronline.com/North-East/February2006/gunsdrugsandrebels18_2.htm; Dr. Sashinungla, Naga-
land: Insurgency and Factional Intransigence, http://ww.satp.org/satporgtp/publication/faultlines/ol-
umel6/Article4.htn (last visited Sept. 21, 2009).
51. Interviews with environmental groups operating in the region, India (May-June 2008).
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intensive ones. The Taliban's regulation of the non-labor-intensive illicit smuggling with
licit goods trade bought it the favor of Afghanistan's trafficking groups in the early 1990s,
but it was only in late 1995, when it came to tolerate and regulate the labor-intensive
opium economy, that it obtained political capital from the larger population. Similarly, as
discussed above, the non-labor-intensive smuggling of heroin has limited the political cap-
ital of India's belligerents in the Northeast.
The labor-intensive or non-intensive character of illicit economies also influences how
politically costly government actions against illicit economies are. A government's efforts
to crack down on labor-intensive illicit economies are far more politically costly than on
less labor intensive ones, even in the absence of violent conflict. India, for example, has a
rather extensive legal cultivation of opium poppy for medicinal purposes. Between seven
and forty thousand hectares of opium poppy have been cultivated in the states of Madhya,
Pradesh, Rajasthan, and Uttar Pradesh over the past ten years, employing between 75,000
and 160,000 farmers as cultivators and several hundred thousand as collectors of the
opium gum during harvest time.52 The production method adopted under the licensing
scheme in India, however, permits a significant leakage of opium into the illegal market
for opiates. 53 An alternative opium gum collection method, the so-called "poppy straw
concentrate method," adopted, for example, in Turkey, would allow the government of
India to eliminate diversion of licensed opium into the illegal market, thus enhancing law
enforcement and the fight against the drug trade. Yet the poppy straw concentrate
method is much less-labor intensive than the traditional practices in India and, if adopted,
it would eliminate the livelihoods of thousands of poor Indians currently working in the
"legal" opium business. Because these rural poor would have no legal economic alterna-
tives, and could pose a significant danger to social stability and become susceptible to
recruitment by Naxalites (India's current Communist insurgency), dacoits, and other
armed groups, the government of India has refused to adopt the poppy straw method and
prioritize law enforcement. 54
The presence or absence of independent traffickers determines the extent to which bel-
ligerents can provide protection and regulation to the population against the traffickers.
To the extent that independent traffickers are present and abuse the population, the bel-
ligerents can insert themselves into the relationship and act as protection and regulation
agents, thus increasing the well-being of the population and their political capital. If traf-
fickers are not present, for example, because belligerents eliminated them, belligerents
cannot provide the same scope of protection and regulation services to the producers, and
hence their political capital decreases.
Finally, government response to the illicit economy critically influences the extent of
the belligerents' political capital derived from the illicit economy. Government response
to the illicit economy can range from suppression-in the case of drugs: eradication and
interdiction-to laissez faire, to some form of official sanctioning such as legalizing the
illicit economy. Although political considerations make legalization of illicit drugs highly
52. U.S. Dept. of State, International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, 2008, http://www.state.gov/p/inl/rls/
nrcrpt/2008; David Mansfield, An Analysis of Licit Opium Poppy Cultivation: India and Turkey (Foreign and
Commonwealth Office of the United Kingdom Apr. 2001), available at http://www.fco.gov.uk/resources/en/
pdf/pdf20/fco-adidu-licitcultivation.
53. See International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, supra note 52.
54. See Mansfield, supra note 52.
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unlikely, such legalization or licensing could be feasible in the case of other contraband
like gems or other legal goods-viz-a-viz the Kimberley certification of diamonds from
Africa. The more the government attempts to suppress a labor-intensive illicit economy,
the more it creates demand for the belligerents' protection and regulation services, and
the more dependent both the criminal business elites and the wider population are on the
belligerents for the preservation of the illicit economy. Government suppression policies,
such as the effort to eradicate illicit crops, thus frequently have the inadvertent effect of
strengthening the belligerents politically by undermining the willingness of the popula-
tion to provide intelligence on the belligerents to the government. Accurate and actiona-
ble human intelligence is of course essential for successful counterterrorism and
counterinsurgency operations.
Although frequently alienating the population, government efforts to crack down on
illicit economies rarely result in a substantial curtailing of the belligerents' financial in-
come. Drug eradication policies, for example, so far have not bankrupted or seriously
weakened even one belligerent group. Government policies against illicit economies such
as eradication frequently fail to bankrupt belligerents because belligerents and producers
of illicit products and services have a variety of adaptation methods at their disposal: relo-
cating production to new areas, altering production methods to avoid detection or survive
suppression, or even switching to other illicit economies. Going after the belligerents'
finances, including those derived from illicit economies, is inherently difficult and rarely
limits their physical resources. But in the case of labor-intensive illicit economies in poor
countries, such suppression efforts, especially those that affect the larger population, can
greatly increase the belligerents' political capital and hamper the government's intelli-
gence acquisition, and hence the overall counterinsurgency and counterterrorism efforts.
The awareness of how dangerous actions against the rural population's livelihood dur-
ing an active insurgency can be did not escape Mao Zedong, the great theoretician and
ultimate practitioner of modern insurgency. During his years as the insurgency leader and
ruler of China, Mao's policy toward China's opium poppy economy fluctuated with how
dependent his power was on the support of the rural population, and conversely how
much control over the population he had.
All along, Mao, like other early 20th century Chinese politicians, regarded opium con-
sumption and opium cultivation as imperial evils designed to subjugate China and prevent
it from modernizing. Not only had opium consumption caused devastating addiction
rates in China by the early twentieth century, but opium was also associated with colonial
exploitation.5 5 The British, who funded much of the Asian empire through the sales of
opium cultivated in British India, fought two wars with China in the 19th century to force
it to continue permitting the consumption and purchases of opium. China was Britain's
principal market, and consequently the efforts of the Chinese government to limit con-
sumption to reduce addiction rates would have had significant financial consequences for
the Raj. 56 At the peak, in 1880, China imported 6500 tons of opium from British India.
But as escalating addiction rates resulted in an exploding demand, China itself started
55. For the evolution of elite and popular attitudes toward opium production and cultivation in China, see
Frank Dikdtter et al., Narcotic Culture: A Social History of Drug Constimption in China, 42 BRIT. J. OF CRIMI-
NOLOcG 317, 317-36 (2002).
56. See OPIUM REGIMES: CIIINA, BRITAIN, AND JAPAN, 1839-1952 (Timothy Brook & Bob Tadashi
Wakabayashi eds., 2000).
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cultivating opium poppy in the second half of the 19th century. By the early 20th century,
China produced 22,000 tons of opium, an economy that provided the livelihood of tens of
millions of people in the countryside.5 7
Officially, the Chiang Kai-shek government periodically sought to prohibit opium
poppy cultivation and the consumption of opium during the 1920s and 1930s, such as
during the Six-Year Opium Suppression Plan between 1934 and 1940. Yet it repeatedly
reneged on its efforts and at least clandestinely tolerated opium cultivation and distribu-
tion in order to finance its costly military campaigns against the Japanese during the Man-
churia invasion, the rebellious Chinese warlords, and again against the Japanese after the
1937 invasion of China.5 8 As the Nanjing government's fiscal resources were severely
limited, opium provided an attractive source of revenue. Indeed, it provided attractive
profits for other belligerents as well: the Japanese occupation armies supported and taxed
opium poppy cultivation, production, and distribution as did the various Chinese
warlords.
But although opium poppy provided a source of funding for Mao's opponents, and
although ideologically it was an anathema to him, Mao too did not attempt to interfere
with the poppy economy during his insurgency years. Large segments of the rural popu-
lation were dependent upon the poppy economy, and Mao was in turn in need of the rural
population's support, or at least its tolerance of his anti-Chiang Kai-shek insurgency.
Over time, not only did Mao tolerate poppy cultivation, he actually came to tax it as
well. 59 It was only after he defeated Chiang Kai-shek in 1949, and established firm con-
trol throughout China that Mao undertook a massive and very brutal poppy eradication
campaign and forced treatment of addicts. 60 Its effectiveness was critically dependent on
Mao's and the Chinese Communist Party's (CCP) control over the territory and the pop-
ulation. In territories with ethnic minorities, such as the Tibetans or the Yi who cultivated
opium poppy, and where the CCP's control was tenuous, the suppression drives pro-
ceeded gradually and attempted to include some economic alternatives. In Han territories
where Mao was firmly in charge, suppression was enforced without restraint. As CCP's
control over the ethnic minority areas also increased during the 1950s, drug suppression
there came to be conducted with fervor and brutality similar to that elsewhere in China.6 1
While accompanied by great brutality and tremendous suffering of both the cultivators
and the addicts, Mao's poppy eradication drive turned out to be highly effective, and the
largest suppression campaign of illicit crop in history. Within a few years, hundreds of
57. Leonard P. Adams, China: The Historic Setting of Asia's Profitable Plague, in Tin, PoLrnlcs OF HEROIN
IN SourTIVAST AsiA 361 (Alfred McCoy ed., 1972).
58. For a detailed account of the anti-narcotics policies in China in the first half of the 20th century, see
EDWARD R. SLACK, OPIUM, STATE, AND SociETy: CmiNA's NARCO-ECONOMY AND -IlE GUOmINDANG,
1924-1937 (2001); Z14OU YONGMING, ANTi-DRUG CRUSADES IN TwEi,.vriTI CFNrTURY CHINA: NATrioN-
ALISM, HISTORY, AND STATE-BUILDING (1999).
59. Chen Yung-fa, The Blooming Poppy under the Red Sun: The Yan'an Way and the Opium Trade, in N.-w
PERSPECTIVES ON Ti IF CHIiNES. COMmUMSr REVOLUTION 263, 263-97 (Tony Saich & Hans van de Ven
eds., 1995).
60. Id.
61. Zhou Yongming, Antidrug Campaigns in Ethnic Communities in the Early People's Republic of China, in
DANGEROUS HARVEST: DRUG PLANrI'S AND -TiE TRA.NSFORiATION OF INDIGENOUS LANDSCAPi.S, 232-48
(,Michael K. Steinberg et al. eds., Oxford University Press 2004) (1999).
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thousands of hectares of poppy were wiped out in China, and cultivation has not returned
in any significant way there for six decades. 62
V. State Cooption of Illicit Economies
Although illicit economies threaten states in a multitude of ways, and although they
frequently thrive in ungoverned spaces, criminal actors with vested interests in the illicit
economy frequently do not desire a complete collapse of the state. This is especially so if
there are no belligerents ready to provide the governing function, and the crime entrepre-
neurs themselves are unable or unwilling to provide it. Nor do the criminal business elites
necessarily desire a weak state as long as the state is not antagonistic to the illicit economy.
In fact, if the state is, at minimum, not attempting to suppress the illicit economy or is in
fact favorably disposed to the illicit economy, the traffickers/producers may even welcome
the state and oppose the belligerents.
Rather than criminal elites always existing in a fully antagonistic relationship with the
state, criminal organizations and the governing elite sometimes develop a mutually benefi-
cial accommodation.6 3 Such an accommodation is not optimal from the perspective of the
society, and certainly undermines the rule of law and democracy, but it may well result in
a sustainable internal modus operandi, at least to the extent that external actors do not
threaten such an accommodation by insisting on the destruction of the illicit economy.
For example, Chiang Kai-Shek's accommodation of the illicit opium economy and its
criminal elites went further than the clandestine dabbling in the drug trade already dis-
cussed. 64 Not only did he come to tolerate and tax the illicit economy, his government
also absorbed some of the most prominent Chinese opium traffickers. 65 Foremost among
them was Du Yuesheng, the leader of Shanghai's crime group/secret society, the Green
Gang, whose members constituted the majority of the one hundred thousand gangsters in
Shanghai during the 1920s and 1930s. 66
Du Yuesheng's control of the drug trade in China in the 1920s and his power in the
Shanghai underworld, as well as in the regular business community at first repeatedly
clashed with Chiang's power ambitions and his anti-drug efforts. 67 Yet during each con-
frontation, not only was the state not able to muster enough coercive power against Du,
Du was in fact able to offer to serve the interests of the Nanjing government, and thus co-
opt the state and consolidate his power in Shanghai.68 The first of these encounters was
Du's decision to support the Nanjing government against the Chinese Communist Party
during the 1920s labor riots in Shanghai.6 9 Du's street thugs and his control over the
labor movement dealt a significant blow to the CCP's mobilization efforts in Shanghai,
62. SLACK, st-pra note 58, at 154-55.
63. Bertil Lintner, Drnigs and Economic Growth: Ethnicity and Exports, in BURMA: PROSPECT FOR A DAIO-
ckATic FLrURE, 165-84 (Robert I. Rotberg ed., 1998).
64. For a detailed account, see BRIAN G. MAR-rIN, THE SHANGHAI GREEN GANG: POLITICS AND ORGAN-
]ZED CRIME, 1919-1937 79 (1996).
65. Id. at 84.
66. Id. at 158.
67. Id. at 148.
68. Id. at 190.
69. Id. at 85.
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and drove the CCP into the countryside, thus awarding a major victory to Chiang's
Guomindang.70
Even more important for Du's cooptation of the state were his mobilization of anti-
Japanese resistance and his provision of governance in Shanghai during the 1932 Manchu-
ria Invasion. 71 While the Guomindang government in Shanghai was paralyzed by the
Japanese invasion and teetering on collapse, Du mobilized both his street "assets" and the
legal business elite to distribute food, medicines, and governance, and to provide military
resistance against the Japanese.72 At the same time, his activities allowed him to expand
greatly his already large racketeering and extortion business in the city. 73 He was also
catapulted to the top of the business community in Shanghai. 74 Faced with Du's great
coercive, as well as political capital, the Chiang Kai-Shek government aborted its efforts to
undermine his power, and instead incorporated him into the government, putting him in
charge of afltL-iidCcOtics efforts In Sfldgiiai.7 5 Du's official position in the couriternarcot-
ics agency allowed him to control the drug trade and continue profiting from it, while at
the same time facilitating clandestine revenues for the Guomindang's government. 76 This
mutually beneficial agreement lasted until Mao's takeover of China in 1949.77 The state
co-opted the top criminal while the top criminal co-opted the state.
Similarly, despite the simplistic assumption that large illicit economies simply contrib-
ute to state failure, the state is not always eviscerated or even undermined by the presence
of large-scale illicit economies. A democratic, accountable regime will of course be
threatened in the multiple ways indicated above by the presence of a large-scale illicit
economy, but the survival of a weak or unaccountable state may well be enhanced by its
ability to capture or profit from illicit economies. The regimes in Burma, North Korea,
Afghanistan, and Haiti during the 1990s for example, were able to survive precisely be-
cause they were able to capitalize on several illicit economies.78
Moreover, the elimination of an illicit economy, whether inadvertent or systematically
carried out by the state or an international actor, may actually cause the full unraveling of
the state and the emergence of new threats resulting from a more complete lack of gov-
ernance and state collapse. There is nothing inevitable about legal economic enterprises
emerging in the wake of the destruction of an illicit economy. The consequent economic
void and the resulting political instability can sometimes generate greater threats to the
international system and neighboring states than state cooption of an illicit economy and
the consequent perpetuation of a corrupt and authoritarian government in power. The
total governing and economic collapse following the destruction of an illicit economy
without a systematic and directed build-up of a legal economy is likely to be also consider-
ably more damaging to the basic interests of the population than the presence of a large-
scale illicit economy and corrupt governing elites. But even in the case of legitimate gov-
70. Id. at 86-89.
71. Id. at 150.
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ernments that nonetheless are unable to exercise effective control over large portions of
their territory, such as the Peruvian government since the late 1990s, government efforts
to suppress an illicit economy that provides the only available livelihood to tens of
thousands can contribute to further weakening of the legitimacy and the reach of the state,
with the population no longer welcoming state presence. 79
VI. Conclusion
The presence of a large-scale illicit economy generates a multitude of threats to the
state where the economy is located, and sometimes also to other states. These threats
include political, accountability, and rule of law threats; economic and environmental
threats, and most critically, security threats. The ability of belligerent groups opposing
the government or threatening other states to sponsor and participate in illicit economies
provides them not only with large financial profits, but frequently also with critical politi-
cal capital. This is especially the case when belligerents protect and regulate labor-inten-
sive illicit economies in poor countries where the population faces a critical lack of legal
economic alternatives and is dependent on the illicit economy for basic livelihood.
But despite the multitude and potential magnitude of threats that illicit economies pose
to states, the policy implication should not be simplistically interpreted as always being a
"by all means" attempt to suppress the illicit economy. Such suppression efforts fre-
quently fail to reduce the physical resources of belligerents because belligerents can adapt
their financing strategies in a variety of ways. Moreover, in the absence of a strong legal
economy, such suppression efforts can have devastating economic effects on the larger
population, and hence lose the government's "hearts and minds" struggle. Furthermore,
if the goal of the policy is to prevent state collapse and the unraveling of even minimal
governance and economic activity-no matter how corrupt and authoritarian-the sup-
pression of illicit economies may well critically undermine such a goal. Policies against
illicit economies, unquestionably desirable and important, thus need to be carefully
weighed with respect to the goal they are supposed to accomplish, as well as their secon-
dary, but important effects. They also need to be carefully calibrated with systematic and
directed efforts to build up a legal economy that can reduce the economic and social
importance of the illegal economy to the population. The provision of security and the
growth of the legal economy are essential for both conflict limitation and reducing illicit
economies.
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